Last week the Portland Development Commission received a "Risk Assessment Report" from Pinnell-Busch, an outside consultant, on the progress of the Fill-to-Pill-Hill Tram (Ftpht, sounding something like a Bronx cheer). Professor Bogdanski provided a link to the report, which makes for fascinating reading. The report’s basic conclusion is that the Ftpht can be completed for $55 million total, if the City and the contractors get stronger management in place at once and don’t fiddle with the design.
Pinnell-Busch is not a regular part of the network of consultants who cluster around the government, and as far as I know it wasn’t involved in the tram project until PDC engaged it to evaluate progress. Its founder, Steve Pinnell, literally wrote the book on how contractors should pursue claims for construction change orders and project delays.
The report seems to me to be a fair look at the tram, with two exceptions. First is that in the summary on page 1, the authors write, "The project is too far along now to stop or even slow down, as the biggest risk for increased cost is delay." The body of the report explains why slowing down construction will increase the cost, but does not analyze the cost of stopping construction altogether. These sentences from page 4 better reflects what the report says about delays: "It is too late for additional value engineering changes. The Lower Station shelter was recently deleted, which saved $457,000. Most other work is too far along to change and the savings from changes would be exceeded by the cost of delays."
Second is that when the authors criticize the current management of the project, they use diplomatic language. For example, they write on page 6: "A cost tracking engineer/manager is also needed [at the City] for at least two months, full time, to ensure a better level of cost control. This person should continue to work for one or two weeks per month to review expenditures and forecasts. This should ensure that the City has a reliable budget and stays on track." In undiplomatic language, this says: "The City didn’t oversee the contractors’ time and costs. If the City wants this project to come in on time and on [the tripled] budget, it needs to hire someone at once to be the public watchdog."
The thing in the report that most interested me was this passage on page 2, stating one of the risk factors for delay and additional cost: "The need to finalize a formal agreement with the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) for crossing I-5, Barbur Boulevard, and Terwilliger Boulevard that would document the preliminary concurrence by ODOT and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)." I think this means that the City doesn’t yet have all the permits it needs to build and operate the tram, because it doesn’t have permission to run the tram over Interstate 5 (which the state owns), and Barbur Boulevard and Terwilliger Boulevard (which I thought the City owned, but apparently the state does). The City can build the towers, but it needs the state’s permission to string the cables over the highways. Tram opponents may have one more faint chance to stop the project.
A few lines above this is another risk factor: "Unanticipated problems with permits to be issued by various regulatory agencies. The City has in place staff to assist and expedite the review and issuance of permits, but some could still be missed or delayed." Exhibit #1 to the report gives some clues to the other permits the project needs: tree cutting permits, an environmental permit for the work in and around Terwilliger Boulevard, a state permit for the elevators, a permit to close Interstate 5 when the cable is pulled up, other traffic (street closure?) permits, Port of Portland permits to import the material, and electrical permits. I’d love to know if the Tram-rammers have as much trouble getting permits from the City as the general public does.